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Is law ethnocentric?
Recognized as a master in the emerging discipline of comparative jurisprudence, which he helped to create, William Twining set out to write about law and institutions from a truly global perspective. This meant resisting the urge to assume that it is possible to continue doing sound work in legal theory, or the philosophy and sociology of rights and institutions, solely from within Western traditions.
The standpoint of Western legal-political traditions vis-à-vis other practices of law and the political ontologies of the world remains unclear. All too often, Western law and politics presents themselves not only as one among various ways of regulating human relations, but also as the unique representative of human regulation. That is, as being the one that measures and defines all the multitude of normative ways in the world, having the capacity to travel everywhere and be more or less universally applicable. Twining's lesson challenged such facile representations. He argued that to accept the profoundly influential character of the rich heritage of Western legality and socio-political theory did not mean having to deny that, from a global standpoint, academic law and practice appear to be 'generally parochial, narrowly focused and even unempirical'. 1 The canon and heritage of Western jurisprudence and socialpolitical theory not only appear narrow and parochial when viewed from a global perspective, but they also, as Twining sharply observed, 'tend … towards ethnocentrism '. 2 What does it mean to say that Western law tends towards Eurocentrism and ethnocentrism? A tendency is an inclination towards a particular type of behaviour; a proclivity or predisposition. Building upon Twining's insight I am going to argue in this paper that what predisposes the canon and heritage of Western jurisprudence and socio-political theory towards the particular (i.e. ethnocentrism, Eurocentrism) is not its claim towards universality. Rather, it is the specific form of unity and uniqueness assumed by Western law that predisposes it towards a particular ethnocentric behaviour. Western law is seen not as one element among others in the set of humanity's normative ways, but as the one that defines and measures what counts as part of the set, as the very standard of humanity: an understanding which it projects upon the other peoples it encounters around the world.
The intersection opened up by the convergence between law and anthropology is a good place to search for instances of such an inclination, to criticize them, and in the process to try to recover the standpoint of a more universal view of nature and the human. Twining's position, second to none within Western Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence and socio-political philosophy, is a powerful example of the ways in which the empirical and comparative study of ontologies and normative cosmologies -pioneered by anthropology -has challenged, even subverted, Western legal protocols and assumptions about what counts as human, as well as its own standpoint as the one and true representative of such a standard.
Such protocols and assumptions about the unity of mankind, and the moral importance of one's location on the planet vis-à-vis others, were derived from Christianized Greek metaphysics. They were then applied to the definition of the human in the sublunary, worldly or 'secular' realm by the sixteenthcentury jurists and theologians who helped to determine the modern cosmopolitan framework in the wake of the 1550 debates in Valladolid, Spain.
Such debates considered the consequences of the encounter between Europeans and Amerindians, and in particular the validity of European claims towards global hegemony. In the process, these jurists and theologians, and their successors in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe, invented human geography, geopolitics and modern international law. 3 Sixteenth-century jurists, navigators, cosmographers and theologians determined the cosmopolitical perspective, as well as its basic assumptions concerning the unity of the many beings, peoples and landscapes of the world. This proved influential, indeed quite decisive, in the specific setting of global colonization and empire by European powers. Often taken for granted in mainstream Western legal and social-political theory, such a perspective has been the subject of sustained criticism. This has emerged not only within contemporary anthropology but also in the inter-disciplinary forms of comparativism and legal anthropology practiced by realists in the Americas and elsewhere. In this respect, at least, Twining has proven to be a worthy successor of Bronislaw Malinowski's Crime and Custom in Savage Society, Karl Lewellyn and E. Adamson-Hoebel's The Cheyenne Way, the more contemporary The Life of the Law by Laura Nader, and, more generally, the intellectual attitude exemplified by Claude Lévi-Strauss's classic Tristes Tropiques.
In Tristes Tropiques, Lévi-Strauss told a story about the 'absolute, total and intransigent dilemmas by which the men of the sixteenth century felt themselves to be faced', which is thoroughly apposite to the question concerning the tendencies toward ethnocentrism present in Western law from its very inception in early modernity. 4 According to Lévi-Strauss, 'commission after commission was sent out to determine the nature' of the inhabitants of the New World. In the course of what was tantamount to a psycho-sociological inquiry, 'conceived according to the most modern standards', the colonists were required to answer a series of questions, says Lévi-Strauss, 'the purpose of which was to find out if, in their opinion, the Indians were or were not' capable of living like Castilian peasants -that is, crucially, like autonomous economic agents. 'All the replies were negative', the anthropologist tells us. The Amerindians refused to 4 C. Lévi-Strauss, Tristes Tropiques (Penguin Modern Classics, 2011) [1955] 75 ff. work in accordance with the economic imperatives of the time. They carried perversity 'to the point of giving away their possessions'. The alleged lack of a work ethic similar to that of Protestants and counter-reformist Catholics, and the apparent absence of notions of private property, were just the tip of the iceberg.
According to the sociological inquiry carried out by these thoroughly modern commissions, the aborigines 'eat human flesh, and have no form of justice '. 5 The point is clear: for these fact-finding commissions, composed of jurists and Christian theologians who followed the protocols of what we now call the social sciences, Amerindians had no 'law' and were either outside of humanity or occupied a lower place in its internal moral hierarchy, being a less perfect, unrealized form of the human. This was evidenced by their practices: their refusal to enjoy without sharing; their symbolic practices concerning the righting of communal wrongs and the treatment of prisoners captured in warfare; and most of all their refusal to hold any belief concerning the unity of God, King and Law. Muslims may hold the wrong beliefs, observed the Christian jurists and theologians doing their fieldwork in the Americas from the sixteenth century onwards, but in comparison to Amerindians at least they showed constancy in their beliefs.
Jurists and Christians theologians, as well as their more liberal successors, either ignored or disavowed the ways in which the Amerindians' refusal to believe, accumulate or to conquer evil by externalizing it in a figure of absolute enmity (captives, even those intended for execution, would be given wives and spend years as members of the community) were linked to Amerindian demands for reciprocity between human groups (extended in some cases to nonhumans).
In this respect, what the proto-sociologists and jurists of the sixteenth century missed was the emergence of the rule as rule in the context of gift-economies rather than exchange-economies, the recognition of which required the ability to assume the existence of an alternative viewpoint. Due to their intransigent focus on a specific form of unity (setting constant and faithful belief in God, the Sovereign and his Law, whether excessive or moderate, as the unique standard of humanity) our thoroughly modern jurists and sociologists were blind to alternative viewpoints.
Arguably, mainstream practices of Western law, although nominally secular, continue to be obsessed by a specific form of unity that is derived from its roots in Western Christian theology: whether one believes too much or too little still serves as a unique indicator of the place one occupies in the hierarchy of humanity. Belief is a standard. One is set apart from all others in the globe, in the very act of defining and measuring such others against the constancy of belief as a unique standard of humanity. Consider, for instance, the focus of security laws and 'responsibility' doctrines. These hijack the universalist impulse of human rights law at home and abroad in the service of particularist views concerning the alleged threat posed by foreign immigrants and cultures, all too often identified as 'fundamentalist' enemies, to the allegedly weak, moderate, liberal polities of the Judeo-Christian West. The framework of such laws and doctrines is the alleged struggle between those who believe too much and cannot make their specific religion a private affair and those who believe too little and manage to privatize belief. In principle, there is no space for questioning this basic framework that separates the peoples of the world between religious privatizers and fundamentalists, or to consider the challenge posed to it by the existence of religions without belief such as those observed among pre-Columbian Amerindians. If the spectre of possibilities that frames current emphases on security laws and responsibility doctrines at home and abroad runs from too much belief, exemplified by the alleged fanaticism of Eastern law, to too little belief in the case of liberal Western law, then it turns out that the former has no monopoly over religious inspiration. Western law too has never been secular.
The story about the modern, constant, sovereign subject that Western commissioners expected but failed to find among Amerindians is also a story about how this subject is able to privatize religion and belief, rather than prevail The more globalized and disenchanted the world became, 'the more society sought solace and refuge in religion and religious movements', which sought an answer to the thin morality of 'secular' modern societies in the thick, 6 See N. Lacey, A Life of HLA Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream (Oxford University Press, 2006) . strong and constant unity of belief in God, King, and Law. 7 Normative accounts informed by political theology have continued to haunt 'the epistemic certitude and assurances of sociology, and western society', and thus, also, of sociologically-minded Western understandings of law and normativity. This is so 'not because religion is a historical and developmental vestigial order that modern society cannot digest, but precisely because religions remain as modern as contemporary society '. 8 This insight is important in order to provide an answer to our question concerning Western law's ethnocentric tendencies -part and parcel of the project of modernity as an imperial and colonial project -referred to by Twining.
More specifically, there are two tendencies that converge within Western law as part of the project of modernity: an imperial propensity to externalize evil, on the one side, and the legal, institutional use of religion as a normative political technology that determines as much the horizon of the social as the horizon of the subjective. In particular, religion as a normative technology contributes decisively in the production and inscription of certain types of subjectivity, the incorporation of the other into ourselves.
It is at this point that the insights of anthropology deploy their most radical and critical force within Western academic law. For it turns out that modern concerns with the cannibalistic practices of Amerindian others were in The implication is that to make the truth of our liberal values count over the superstitious beliefs of others in darker places left behind by the march of history, moderate values must be strengthened -become less moderate and tolerant -and even forcibly imposed. And if our moderate values can be imposed, that is because these 'others' are culturally backward, incapable of true meaning and are meaningless instead.
Let's understand by 'otherness' or 'alterity' something more essential and concrete: the universal condition for reciprocity. In such a condition, others aren't just the obscure object of our desires, sympathy or antipathy, but have desires of their own, produce meaning and have the ability to respond. Their words, their meanings, their ways and responses cannot be denied or disavowed.
For words aren't just some neutral medium of communication, but bearers of value. As such, they're offered to others as something that comes from inside, as a gift. It is in the act of exchanging gifts, words, communicating and making alliances through marriages or in ritual confrontation, that reciprocity emerges.
We engage in reciprocal relations not because we share the same values, actually or potentially, but because we need the act of sharing to transform ourselves just as we transform our environments. Alterity means that no relation with a natural environment is a one-way street. And if we must also be ready to be transformed then no place of origin, or shared account of origins, should hold moral priority.
The West has no privileged moral position.
If others and their environments were incapable of meaning then our relations with them would have only one sense and direction: our way, our Western way. Their alterity itself would be meaningless, insofar as the only others that matter to us are those who, being able to hold on with constancy to some recognizable belief in the unity of God, Law and the Sovereign, can transact business with us and exchange goods and ideas on the basis of trustworthy contracts. Specifically modern legal technologies -prison, confession, mandates, interventions, contracts -are thus linked with normatively structured regimes of truth-telling inscribed in terms of skin colour, supposedly revelatory of geopolitical location and capacity. Western law thus tends towards ethnocentricity, as Twining suggested, in this very precise way.
There are other ways: from the Cheyenne Way to the Chilean Way
Absent from the picture of legal and political globalization that focuses on strengthening moderate liberal values in a world of global contracts and exchanges, divided between those who believe too much and those who believe too little, is the insight of anthropologists. They observe the universality of a politics of law and reciprocal relations arising not only, or not at all, from a system of exchanges of beliefs and goods, but rather from solving the problem of how to manage relations among humans, and between humans and nonhumans, in situations of meaningful alterity.
The story of the emergence of such an insight is linked to the history of contemporary anthropology itself, in its relation with law. Here we can distinguish between three stages in that history, associated with the work of three different generations of anthropo-legal scholars. Malinowski was the single most important figure in setting the stage for the contemporary anthropological study of law, in much the same way that Lévi-Strauss is for anthropology in general. The work of the first generation -Malinowski, Lévi-Strauss, Llewellyn and Hoebel -demonstrated two things that anthropology and comparative ontology now view as self-evident: that all societies can be presumed to have a politics of law and reciprocal relations, regardless of the presence of Western trappings; and that anthropology's signature methods -field ethnography and decolonial genealogy -can be 'profitably applied to the study of law' and the management of co-productive relations between human groups and between these and nonhumans. 11
The work of their worthy successors -people like William Twining, Simon Roberts, Boaventura de Sousa Santos and Eduardo Viveiros de Castroconstitutes the most important contribution to the destruction of the narrow province of jurisprudence and its reconstruction on the basis of localized comparativism, decolonial genealogy and field ethnography. This second generation -including Twining -has taken the emphasis on co-production and doing/making (the focus on problems and what is done about or made through them, known in academic law as the 'case method') to its most creative conclusion: that 'being' is both making and in the making, with human groups coproducing each other as well as their environments through the invention of In this understanding, 'being' is not the result of a singular act of creation or enlightenment taking place somewhere, followed by its diffusion everywhere else through procedures of transplantation, downloading or hybridization that ultimately resemble the form of a pact or a contract. 12 Importantly, the idea of On the contrary, the idea of 'being' as a process of generalized inscription and creolization suggests another answer to the question of how something other than the calculable, legal and ordered would come about, given that in principle there is nothing outside of the calculable, the legal and the ordered. The practical devices we invent in order to solve problems and conflicts (for instance, laws and rights) need to be understood not merely as formal procedures of authorization and the containment of hazardous incalculability or risk, but rather as technical actions, surfaces of inscription, or tools of technical differentiation. To explain: these are technologies that trigger different spacings, delays and rhythms. This is what legal philosopher Hans Lindahl has called borders, limits and fault lines, including, centrally, those that delimit and organize subjects and bodies into different classes, orders and races, cultures or skin colours within a collective natural or social sequence. 13 Put more simply, this second generation of explorers of law, politics and reciprocity across cultures and natures has shown us that our social and natural bonds would be as airy as clouds if there were only contracts between individual subjects guaranteed by their mutual trustworthiness or their ability to hold on to their truth-beliefs. There are also things, technical things and objects, which stabilize our relations, and other ways to demarcate and slow down the time and place of our revolutions. Laws, legal ways and human rights exemplify such things. The next step is to better our understanding of law and its religious matrix as a political technology that produces embodied subjects and orders them, selecting some and deselecting others for the purposes of managing relations among humans and between humans and nonhumans in contexts of radical alterity. These works share a similar standpoint, focusing methodologically on the historical-comparative and genealogical-discursive study of institutions. This is an interpretive approach that challenges the predominance of so-called Rational Choice Theory and methodological individualism in the social sciences. It starts from the observation of a common set of problems. These stem from the areas of the world, such as in the areas of law, policy and rights by those who insist that it is possible to do work in legal and political theory solely from the perspective of a parochial canon of Western theory and practice oblivious to its own predisposition. We can see this approach in the theories of, and practice derived from the work of, the Law and Economics school, Social Choice theorists, and cost-benefit analyses. 16 The interpretive approach I espouse agrees with those exploring legal conceptions, social bonds and institutions in non-Western parts of the globe, from a wide variety of disciplines, including hard sciences such as genetics as well as the life and earth sciences, but also anthropology, the philosophy of religion and literature. From these we learn that certain epistemic disconnects, idées fixes and automatic reflexes add to the basic constraints already faced by The points made in the previous paragraphs also constitute the best introductory framework for the aims of the following sections of this chapter.
Like the approaches mentioned earlier (general jurisprudence, law and globalization, historical comparativism, the philosophical and scientific study of 
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18 A more complete exploration of this specific case remains beyond the particular space limits of this paper. comparison between the countries of this region or between this region as a whole and some other global grouping. The second half of this paper shares with the previously mentioned approaches, especially with Twining's General Jurisprudence, the thesis that most processes of 'globalization' take place at subglobal (e.g. Southern, specifically Latin American) levels and that a healthy cosmopolitan discipline of law and political theory (here including cosmopolitical philosophy) should encompass all levels of social relations and the normative orderings of such relations.
In honouring Twining's pioneering work by taking it in a hitherto ignored direction, this chapter hopes to contribute to the critical review and extension of the Western canon of jurisprudence, social theory and political philosophy.
Crucially, this can be done by taking into account, as Twining did, some of the more or less general problems of conceptualization, comparison and generalization, and the relationship between the local and the global. More pointedly, it also initiates a reflection on justice, law and globalization (global social justice) from within a specific tradition. Going beyond the aim of extending the canon, it is my objective to position Latin American Southern voices in human rights not simply as an alternative 'type' -one that could or should be added to others in order to form some sort of rainbow epistemic coalition -but rather as a 'bomb'. The aim here is to explode the boundaries, borders, limits and fault lines assumed by mainstream political philosophy and legal theory. 19 19 See on 'types' and 'bombs', B. Latour, 'Perspectivism, "Type" or "Bomb"?', Anthropology Today, vol. 25, issue, 2. Also, Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, 'The Untimely, Again', an introduction to Pierre Clastres, Archeology of Violence, Semiotext(e), 2010, 9-51. Voices that human rights futures are dependent upon giving voice to suffering, as a concrete force and effect, the result of bad history, and must therefore engage in a discourse of suffering that is militant, i.e. one 'that moves the world'. 23 Another aspect in which Cortázar's thesis, emerging from the experience of Russell II, chimes with Southern voices such as Baxi's, is on its emphasis on the historical character of injustice and justice, over and above all theodicy narratives and eschatological claims. Basically, the policy targeted above-average profits obtained by beneficiaries whose unjustly acquired gains continued to appreciate in value after the perpetrators of past evils have been driven away through wars of independence, anti-slavery or anti-colonial struggle. 'Excess profits' relates also to a crucial legal problem concerning feasible schemes of reparative justice. A crucial difference between the Chilean perspective and that of the multinationals on the issue of nationalization was that for the latter this was a simple matter of compensating for predictable future losses after the takeover, while for the former the takeover was a matter of reparative justice at the heart of post- Challenging Western legal common sense on the issue of just compensation and the constructive value of unjustly accrued wealth, the Allende doctrine can be seen as giving those suffering from historical grievances that persist in the global market economy the right to demand compensation now rather than later against those who tend to treat the past as a series of catastrophes repeated over time, including ours, without end or solution. For those who hold such views, 'the time of rectifying the past is never now'. 27 This is important insofar as such permanent delay -interregnum, to use Thomas Hobbes' terms -has been conceptualized by constitutional lawyers like Carl Schmitt in the case of Nazi Germany or Jaime Guzmán in Pinochet's Chile, as a time of exception. In such exceptional times, they argue, appealing to Roman Law and sixteenth-century justifications of colonialism (viewed through the prism of twentieth-century fascism), it is legitimate to suspend liberties and opt for the lesser evil.
The Chilean Way, the Inseparability Thesis and the Russell Tribunal
Such readings of past history and precedent make a mockery of the Nuremberg Principles and the holocausts (Jewish, Spanish, indigenous, and so on). They condemn human rights futures to a form of 'transitional justice' that ultimately defends as moral the position that nothing should come (politically and legally) after doing 'just enough to achieve political stability'. 28 The dubious model for such a kind of justice has been, precisely, the Chilean 'transition' after the coup. Later on, that model and its economic sidekick, the trickle-down theory of economic justice, would be imported everywhere else in the world. It has become the normal state of affairs since the late twentieth century.
Transitional and trickle-down models insist that arguments of justice must disregard all past history, and that political attempts to eradicate inequality should be avoided for moral reasons: to stave off the repetition of the genocidal past. The result is an untenable separation between ethics and politics that in our time tends to be identified with standard human rights discourse and security humanitarianism. Crucially, the historicism of current human rights and security humanitarianism with respect to the sacrificial past evacuates history; it limits our awareness about particular moments of historical injustice that would inspire us to do something about it here and now, including forcing a resolution to overcome our habit of keeping what we already have at all costs.
This kind of historical awareness is the basis of remedial equality, as Baxi, Ghai and Twining, among others, explain. 'It simply assumes that most inequality is the result of past history', says human rights theorist Robert Meister, 'and that most of history was bad'. 29 But once we start to correct for particular moments of historical injustice, we can legitimately ask: why should we not do away with inequality altogether? 'Were we to treat material equality as both an approximation and a cap on remedial justice,' Meister argues, 'then the most a disadvantaged group can legitimately desire is that its ongoing disadvantage be wiped out.' 30 And once we recognize that the many unequal advantages enjoyed by the beneficiaries of past injustice, such as Kennecott and Anaconda in the case of Chile, could not be justified starting now, then the obvious question becomes 29 R. Meister, After Evil, 258. 30 Ibid. the one Allende asked in terms of a doctrine of excess profits: why not put law to revolutionary use? Start with the recovery of common sources of wealth, such as copper or oil, use the revenue to force a public discussion on the role of markets in society, and then, perhaps, decide that not all goods are properly valued as mere instruments of use or profit; this, of course, was the original point of the Amerindians' refusal to work and their tendency to give away their possessions.
Nowadays, we could, perhaps should, force such a discussion in the cases of knowledge and education, health, family life, nature and art. We need such a discussion, too, in the case of civil liberties or human and post-human rights and duties that attempt to regulate relations not only among humans but also between humans and nonhumans and entire ecosystems in the context of climate change. Certainly, we would agree that these things are not properly or completely valued only as commodities. The point is not so much to destroy property tout court, but rather the more humble one that 'some things in life are corrupted or degraded if turned into commodities'. 31 A similar train of thought led Allende to issue his doctrine on excess profits. At its basis lies the kind of historical and existential awareness of contingency that characterized Allende's political character and attitude more generally. Such awareness accompanied also Sartre's conception of genocide in 1968, and García Márquez and Cortázar's conclusion at the end of Russell II that historical justice is optional, and that, as the former put it, the time and place comes 'where the races condemned to one 31 M. Sandel, What Money Can't Buy. The Moral Limits of Markets (Allen Lane, 2012) 10. Also, J. Cortázar, Papeles Inesperados (Alfaguara, 2013) 268-9, and against the widespread rejection of remedial justice on the basis that all history is irremediably catastrophic, 276 and 282-3. hundred years of solitude will have, at last and forever, a second opportunity on earth'. 32
Rethinking rights for the world of multinational vampires
According to the Latin Americans taking part in Russell II, even though the US had not perpetrated the acts in Chile directly, it was privy to a broader counterrevolutionary framework that regarded all attempts to right historical wrongs and achieve remedial equality, carried out under a variety of names (liberation, Third World-ism, people's rights, democratic socialism, indigenous rights, armed struggle) as attacks against the US and its economic interests.
Thus, the US government could be found guilty of all violence carried out in the name of anti-communism, with the caveat that the use of force directed by the Americans wasn't simply a case of Cold War paranoia, but rather responded to the economic projections of multinational corporations.
The understanding of rights was extended from the 'rights of man' to include 'people's rights', a notion that introduced into rights discourse the rules concerning permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the 'excess profits' legal doctrine, recognized by most countries in the UN General Assembly as the kernel of the project of permanent decolonization. Russell II further 32 G. García Márquez, 'La soledad de América Latina. Estocolmo, Suecia, 8 de diciembre 1982' in Yo no vengo a decir un discurso (Barcelona: Mondadori, 2010) 29. In that closing paragraph of his Nobel lecture, as at the outset, he refers to Allende's death. See also J. Cortázar, Fantomas contra los vampiros multinacionales (México: Excelsior, 1975 ) 58, and Apéndice. Sentencia del Tribunal Russell II, 1974 -1975 declared that the American government and the multinationals had created a state of 'permanent intervention and strategic domination with the intention to assure the highest economic benefits'. 33 It is worth recalling that Frankfurt advisers like Otto Kircheimer and Herbert Marcuse had seen the defence of the economic liberty of powerful agents as the root cause of the violations that had taken place during the Nazi regime.
This was, precisely, the view taken by the Russell II Tribunal. For them, just as in the 1930s, the political representatives of extractive industries and capitalist interests had demanded tolerance for their intolerant positions and defended liberties that in fact sowed the seeds of exploitative oppression. From the 1970s onwards, the self-defined defenders of market liberties appealed to a quasitheological discourse that combined religious and market libertarianism, and interpreted such liberties in the spirit of orthodox radicalism: as the natural law and order of the one true faith, and the only alternative.
In the case of Latin America, such a discourse had been inspired by the conservative and restorative ideologies of 1930s Europe, chief among them fascism and Iberian falangism. Conservative forces directed these against progressive attempts to create a social sector of the economy that could co-exist with, but also limit, the expansionist tendencies of the (globalized) private sector of the economy, while avoiding the shortcomings of a dirigiste public sector. In Chile, the so-called 'Social Area' would comprise the copper mining industries, nitrates, iron and coal, recently nationalized under the 'permanent sovereignty' and 'excess profits' legal doctrines. It would also include part of the finance sector, commerce and trade, strategic monopolies, and the economic activities that conditioned social and economic development, such as energy and oil, construction, communications, paper, and transport. To operate this Social Area, alongside an area of private property and another one of mixed property, was a daunting task. It required, as Chilean jurist and Allende's chief advisor Eduardo Novoa Monreal put it, 'the invention of new blueprints for development oriented towards the construction of socialism '. 35 The fact that a lawyer was one of the main architects of the Chilean Way in government is not without consequence. The 'blueprint' for the creation of the A corollary of this position, developed by rights theorists and anti-racism activists in the 1960s such as Frantz Fanon, was that former and current colonial and neo-colonial powers had a duty to pay reparations to plundered peoples, and the latter had a correlative right to apply forms of remedial justice and equality at the level of global transfers of capital that resulted, and still result, from the more or less overt use of violence by such powers. In October 1963, Argentinean economist and diplomat Raúl Prebisch, a powerful presence in the UN, coined the term 'new international economic order' in order to refer to the concrete actions and reforms that it would be necessary to undertake at the level of the rules of international relations in order to make north-south relations more equal. 38 culture of impunity -but this was a road based on feelings of impotence, guilt about always being too late and an anxiety to pre-empt the next holocaust -or else they could go down the road that started in Nuremberg, passing through the events of 11 September 1973 in Chile. This shows the way to the future: to encourage underlings and whistle-blowers to document and question illegal orders and bad laws; to bring to justice the politically and economically more powerful; to make justice more, rather than less, urgent; not to disavow the dreams and desires of the many on which their past struggles were based; and to provide the conditions for the development of what Baxi has called 'crimes against development'. These would be directed against the more favoured everywhere, and would establish a prosecuting counsel ready to act against old and new tyrants, including our less recognizable economic tyrants, north as well as south.
To their credit, the members of Russell II went for the second option. In the earlier part of the twentieth century it had become clear, thanks to the work of critical theorists informing the prosecution team during the Nuremberg trials, that we could not speak of Nazism (and thus also of racism) without referring to global capitalism as well. 41 Similarly, thanks to the work of Southern voices such as those that gathered at Russell II in the second half of the twentieth century, we cannot think of modernity, law and globalization without considering also colonialism and the decolonial turn of the majority of the peoples of the world. 41 See F. Neumann, H. Marcuse and O. Kircheimer, Secret Reports on Nazi Germany: The Frankfurt School Contribution to the War Effort, R. Laudani, ed., with a foreword by R. Geuss (Princeton University Press, 2013).
Twining's Southern Voices project indicated that the majority of the peoples of the world have expressed themselves in a complex language. This language of pluralism, Third World-ism, popular coalition politics, decolonial and Southern turn, and transformative uses of law such as those made in Chile between 1970 and 1973, builds on the legacy of critical theory's involvement in the Nuremberg trials. 42 The Inseparability Thesis that emerged from Russell II is part of that legacy of human rights and Southern Voices. It asks that the claims of peoples and the many be given more weight than those of the wealthy and the powerful. In doing so, it recognizes that, for the most part, modern history has been written by the victors and is, therefore, not only biased, false, 'tending towards ethnocentrism' as Twining put it, but also uninspiring, incapable of producing human rights futures and making history.
From the standpoint taken in this paper, inspired by Twining's Southern Voices project, the mainstream story of law in modernity is biased and false also because it hides the fact of the impotence of the powerful and their ultimate inability to impose their laws. As Eduardo Mendieta says, echoing the best of contemporary critical theory and the Southern turn of people like Twining and de Sousa Santos, 'modernity is the Aesopian name for a violent historical process in which colonialism, genocide, and ecocide went hand in hand with two other fundamental processes: the spiritual conquest of the peoples to be subjugated, and what we can call epistemic gerrymandering'. 43 Conversely, the fable of law 42 See n. 11. See also U. Baxi, Human Rights in a Post-human World: Critical Essays (Oxford University Press, 2009). 43 E. Mendieta, 'Imperial Somatics and Genealogies of Religion: How We Never Became Secular' in Postcolonial Philosophy of Religion, P. Bilimoria and A.
B. Irvine (eds), 231. He refers to the cartographies, cosmographies and other and modernity tells a tale that dismisses the actions of those who are attaining existence and liberty, and 'who prove every day, precisely, that the greatest power in the world is incapable of imposing its laws', as Sartre put it. 44 If the writing of modern Western legal theory and history has at least contributed to maintaining the conditions of non-existence of the peoples of the non-Western world, then in different but related ways, Sartre, the writers of Russell II, Twining, de Sousa Santos, Mendieta and others are describing the fable of modernity as a process of inscription, individuating people, selecting some and deselecting others from a more integral unity of humanity. But these people in turn seek to negotiate, escape from and radically transform the laws imposed upon them, all the while transforming themselves.
technical graphs and processes of inscription (from grammar to money) described by W. Mignolo in his The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, Territoriality, and Colonization (The University of Michigan Press, 1995). 44 J.-P. Sartre, Il n'y a plus de dialogue posible, 18-19.
